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Effect of Cellular Phone and Radar Forensics on Search and Rescue Duration
for General Aviation Aircraft Accidents in the Contiguous United States
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Abstract
Emergency Locator Transmitters (ELT) are generally the primary tool for locating distressed aircrews following an aircraft accident. In
2009, the International COSPAS-SARSAT organization ordered the cessation of 121.5 MHz ELT satellite monitoring to alleviate
systemic false alarms and encourage pilots to upgrade ELTs to modern 406 MHz models. While most nations acquiesced to the mandate,
the United States encountered severe resistance from pilot groups. As a result, 121.5 MHz ELTs are still in use in the U.S. but remain
unmonitored by satellite systems. This study sought to assess the impact of alternative search methods such as radar and cellular phone
forensic analysis on search and rescue duration. The study collected records from 365 search missions conducted between 2006 and 2011
to determine if there was a significant difference in mission search durations if forensic methods were utilized. Data was transformed and
assessed using ANOVA and Brown-Forsythe F-testing. The study revealed that missions which employed either cellular phone or radar
forensic search methods required significantly longer than missions which did not employ those techniques. Missions utilizing cellular
phone forensics required a mean of 23.4 search hours, whereas missions which did not use cellular forensic methods only required
13.2 hours. Similarly, missions using radar forensics required a mean of 21.3 hours versus 10.0 hours for missions which did not use such
forensics. This research provides valuable data to search and rescue agencies in determining the efficacy of using both cellular phone and
radar forensic methods in search operations.
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Introduction
The use of Emergency Locator Transmitters (ELTs) installed aboard aircraft has long been the primary method
of locating distressed aviators following an aircraft accident. Despite the contributions ELTs have made to aviation search
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and rescue, the technology is not without its flaws. ELTs
and the supporting COSPAS-SARSAT monitoring system
have been plagued with problems since their inception in
1979. ELTs are susceptible to crash damage, which can
disable their transmission capability. Moreover, the design
of older 121.5 MHz ELTs suffers from limited accuracy,
making them less effective than other search mediums.
Finally, false alarms from inadvertently activated
121.5 MHz ELT have overwhelmed the COSPASSARSAT network to such a degree that the search agency
discontinued satellite monitoring of this entire class of
beacons.
Without reliable ELT data, aviation search and rescue
personnel must rely on alternative information sources to
reliably locate aircraft crash sites. Two novel procedures
have evolved to augment, and in some cases, even replace
ELT location data in aircraft search missions: radar and
cellular phone forensic data. Rescuers can tap into recorded
data from the FAA and military radar sites to track the
location of missing aircraft based on their route of flight.
By analyzing cellular network data records, rescuers can
obtain historical and real-time location data for cellular
phones carried by aircraft occupants.
ELT Survivability and False Alarms
Despite the rugged design of ELTs, crash survivability
was initially a problem. Research by Hall (1980) and
Trudell and Dreibelbis (1990) revealed poor post-crash
survivability data for ELTs. Hall (1980) revealed ELTs
were destroyed in more than 60% of crashes. Among
crashes in which the ELT was destroyed, extensive
searches were required to locate 31% of the crash sites
(Hall, 1980). A later study of post-crash data by Trudell
and Dreibelbis (1990) revealed a 61% ELT failure rate.
Trudell and Dreibelbis (1990) further analyzed aircraft
occupant post-crash survival as a function of ELT
operation. Their results revealed that successful activation
of ELTs yielded a 34% survival rate, a 15% advantage
over crash victims without a functioning ELT (Trudell &
Dreibelbis, 1990). An improved standard for ELTs
established by the FAA in 1994, TSO-91a, increased
ELT survivability marginally to 50% (Gauthier, 2009).
To date, no known studies have been published documenting the survivability of modern TSO C-126,
406 MHz ELTs.
In addition to ELT survivability problems, inadvertent or
non-emergency 121.5 MHz ELT activations were a constant plague to the COSPAS-SARSAT monitoring system.
Research by Toth and Gershkoff (1979) reported that false
alarm ELTs made up nearly 95% of all ELT activations.
Trudell and Dreibelbis (1990) reported similar findings,
citing up to 97% of ELT activations were non-distress
events. The U.S. Coast Guard (n.d.) reported that the U.S.
Mission Control Center received 250–400 121.5 MHz

beacon signals each day, of which 99.9% were false alarms.
As a result of the excessive number of inadvertent
121.5 MHz ELT activations, it became standard operating
procedure for search agencies to delay deploying search
resources until the signal was verified by successive
COSPAS-SARSAT satellite passes, a process requiring up
to 100 minutes (Federal Aviation Administration [FAA],
2012; COSPAS-SARSAT, 2009b).
Cessation of 121.5 MHz ELT Monitoring
To curb the quantity of ELT false alarms, the International
COSPAS-SARSAT organization announced the cessation of
121.5 MHz ELT monitoring beginning on February 1, 2009
(COSPAS-SARSAT, 2009a). This measure was designed to
hasten pilot transition to newer, more accurate 406 MHz ELT
beacons (COSPAS-SARSAT, 2009a). Most nations followed
the COSPAS-SARSAT organization’s lead and mandated
ELT model replacement; however, the United States did not.
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) attempted
to enact regulatory mandates to phase out 121.5 MHz
beacons; however, the agency encountered fierce resistance
from pilot advocacy groups (Aircraft Owners and Pilots
Association [AOPA], 2011). AOPA argued that
121.5 MHz ELTs were still viable, and highlighted the
limited availability of 406 MHz models (AOPA, 2011).
The FAA sided with AOPA, warning that the cost to equip
406 MHz ELTs across the nation’s 200,000 general
aviation fleet could top more than $500 million (Brown,
2013). In 2013, the FCC issued a revised proposal to halt
the manufacturing of 121.5 MHz ELTs, but this move
was again met with AOPA resistance (Brown, 2013). To
date, regulations restricting the use and manufacture of
121.5 MHz ELTs remain unchanged.
With the lack of satellite monitoring for 121.5 MHz
ELTs, aviation search and rescue personnel must rely on
alternative means for detecting and locating distressed
aircraft.
Radar Forensic Analysis
Radar forensic analysis relies on the fusion of data
from multiple radar sites, air traffic control recordings,
NEXRAD weather data, and other sources. Assessment of
radar information is conducted by members of the U.S. Air
Force’s 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron (RADES) and a
small group of specialized volunteer members of the Civil
Air Patrol (NSARC, 2011). The methods utilized by the
84th RADES analysts are not publicly available; however,
J. Henderson, an 84th RADES radar analyst, agreed to
describe the process in an interview conducted on April 22,
2013. Another radar analysis specialist from the Civil Air
Patrol provided further forensic background information in
an interview conducted on April 23, 2013, but requested
anonymity.
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Radar analysts access radar data recorded from more
than 300 military and civilian radar sites connected to
the Western Air Defense Sector (WADS). Additionally,
analysts request data from radar sites not participating in
the WADS recording system, when available. Analysts
start by locating the aircraft of interest in the radar
recording and record significant changes in the aircraft’s
status. They note changes in transponder settings, altitude,
and loss of primary or secondary radar information.
Additionally, analysts add data overlays to the radar
information such as terrain maps, airspace, search grids,
radar coverage plots, and NEXRAD weather reports. Radar
data from multiple radar sites can be interlaced and even
synchronized with recorded air traffic control recordings.
Henderson states, "By comparing the target aircraft’s route
of flight against radar coverage overlays, analysts can
confine a search area. Not detecting an aircraft where it is
expected to be and where radar coverage is good is a search
indicator" (personal communication, April 22, 2013).
Search clues can be also be derived by "evaluating
uncharacteristic pilot behaviors and identifying why they
are occurring" (radar analyst, personal communication,
April 23, 2013).
Radar analysts use a powerful data integration tool
dubbed Tactical Mapping. This proprietary software was
engineered by one of the forensic team’s senior radar
analysts. The software is capable of reading 12 different
radar data formats from military, civilian, and international
agencies. The power of the program lies in its ability to
overlay multiple data layers and filter extraneous information, based on operator search parameters.
The effectiveness of radar forensic search techniques is
affected by several factors. To generate radar forensic data,
aircraft must enter a radar coverage area. Generally, radars
are relatively ineffective at low altitude, unless the target
aircraft is near the radar transmitter. Additionally, low
flying aircraft may not intersect enough radar coverage
zones to generate useful forensic data. Radar coverage is
often concentrated near airports around population centers
and areas of high density air traffic. An aircraft’s chances
for radar forensic detection and effective tracking are
improved as the aircraft enters additional radar coverage
areas; this is particularly true in areas with multiple radars
of overlapping coverage. Additionally, the size of the
aircraft is also an important consideration, as larger aircraft
create a proportionally larger radar signature. Excessively
low aircraft speed also affects radar detection. This factor is
especially important for Pulse-Doppler radars, as many of
these systems automatically filter low range-rate targets to
reduce operator scope clutter. It is especially helpful to
radar forensic searches if aircraft activate their onboard
Mode C transponder, as this allows radar forensic analysts
to positively identify the aircraft and simplifies the forensic
data collection process. Ultimately, these factors most often
determine the success of a radar forensic search.
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Cellular Phone Forensic Analysis
Like radar forensic analysis, there is little public or nonproprietary documentation available to review. As a result,
expert interviews were used to formulate critical background for the study in lieu of published literature. B.
Ready and J. Ogden, cellular phone analysis experts from
the Civil Air Patrol, agreed to describe the cellular phone
forensic analysis process in an interview conducted on
April 30, 2013.
Upon receiving a support request, cellular forensic
analysts begin by determining the target cellular phone’s
servicing company. If the provider is not known, a
"portability database" or online repository of cellular phone
servicing data is used to lookup the phone’s service
provider. Analysts then assess the target aircraft’s expected
route of flight and determine where it intersects cellular
coverage areas, and the accompanying cellular service
towers. Analysts submit a special data request to the
servicing cellular phone provider and applicable roaming
tower owners for cellular phone parametric usage data.
Forensic information can alert analysts to which sector, or
wedge of the cellular tower’s antenna was used to
communicate with the target cellular phone. Cellular phone
forensic analysis is often carried out in tandem with radar
forensic analysis, using the same Tactical Mapping
software; however, this procedure will not be addressed
in this paper.
Cellular carriers derive geolocation information via
two methods. The first method determines cellular phone
location using a form of triangulation by measuring the
difference in signal arrival times at different cellular towers
(Hatfield, 2002). Other carriers digitally query the handheld
device to provide coordinates from derived from an
integrated GPS receiver (Hatfield, 2002). The accuracy of
cellular phone searches vary based on the location method
used and technological capabilities of both the cellular
tower and handheld device. Federal wireless 911 requirements mandate cellular phone location reporting accuracy
between 50 and 300 meters, however, GPS-equipped
phones can report location accurate to nearly 10 meters
(Di Justo, 2009).
In rare cases, forensic analysts are able to make active
contact with the target cellular phone via voice or text
message. In these cases, analysts advise victims to call 911,
as the 911 system is capable of automatically determining
the location of wireless callers much more rapidly than
forensic methods.
Several factors affect cellular forensic searches. Analysts
emphasize that forensic data can only be generated when a
phone is powered on and connected to the cellular phone
network. Forensic information is generated when a phone is
used to make phone calls, transmit text messages, and access
cellular data. Certain phones only provide forensic data
when actively used for phone calls. In addition to the above
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examples, cellular phones generate a forensic signature as
they are automatically handed off between servicing towers.
Any disruption in connectivity between the device and the
cellular network can adversely impact the quantity and
usefulness of forensic data. Cellular forensic searches are
unusable if the target phone is turned off or switched to a
non-transmitting mode, such as airplane mode. Additionally,
mountainous terrain or other obstructions can disrupt the
phone’s connectivity with cellular towers, thus preventing
the receipt of useful forensic data. Cellular forensic searches
are also ineffective in particularly remote areas where the
presence of cellular towers is sparse or non-existent. Cellular
forensic methods are most effective in areas of flat terrain,
not overly distant from population centers or transportation
corridors, where the vast majority of cell phone tower
coverage is concentrated.
Wireless-Enhanced 911
Modern 911 systems are capable of automatically
determining the location of landline callers through an
enhancement known as Enhanced 911 (Hatfield, 2002). As
the number of emergency calls received from wireless
phones grew, it became apparent that a mechanism similar
to Enhanced 911 was needed to determine location
information for cellular callers. Codified in the 1999
Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act, regulations were enacted to create a system to provide
geolocation information for emergency callers (Hatfield,
2002). When calling 911, an automated process assigns
the wireless caller a pseudo phone number that is
associated with the cellular tower’s directional antenna
receiving the caller’s signal (Hatfield, 2002). A series of
automated processes compares the cellular caller’s location with established jurisdictional boundaries, and routes
the call to the appropriate emergency call center (Hatfield,
2002). The cellular carrier’s Mobile Positioning Center
digitally transmits the phone’s callback number and
location to the 911 system’s Automatic Location
Information database used at the emergency call center
(Hatfield, 2002).
Cellular Carriage Regulations
Regulations complicate the use of cellular phone forensic
information for aviation search and rescue applications.
The carriage and use of cell phones is regulated by both the
Federal Aviation Administration and Federal Communications Commission.
Codified in FAA-AC 91-21.1A, the FAA placed limits
on the in-flight use of personal electronic devices (PEDs),
with specific prohibitions against the use of cellular
phones and other transmitting devices (FAA, 2006). These
rules were originally implemented to avoid PEDs causing in-flight interference with aircraft navigation and

communications systems (FAA, 2006). A recent review
of the issue resulted in the FAA relaxing PED restrictions and subsequently canceling the advisory circular.
Based on 14 CFR 91.21, FAA regulations delegate the
authority for determining PED interference and usage to
the operator or pilot in command of the aircraft
("Electronic," 2014, Portable Electronic Devices, para. 1).
The FCC specifically prohibits the airborne use of
cellular phones based on 47 CFR 22.925, which states that
"when any aircraft leaves the ground, all cellular phones
must be turned off" ("Electronic," 2014, Prohibition on
Airborne Operation of Cellular Phones, para. 1). Similar to
the FAA restriction, this regulation was implemented
largely to prevent airborne cellular operation from interfering with other communications processes, particularly
those in the 800 MHz band (Federal Communications
Commission, n.d.). The agency is currently considering
relaxing airborne operation restrictions on cellular phones.
This proposed rulemaking policy adjustment is currently in
the public comment process (FCC, 2014).
The relaxing of regulations pertaining to the in-flight
activation of cellular phones could greatly enhance the
availability of useful data to forensic experts when
performing aviation search and rescue operations.
Commercial and Emerging Search Technologies
In addition to the aforementioned aviation search and
rescue technologies, several emerging commercial systems
have also been fielded to respond to aviation distress events.
Known collectively as Satellite Emergency Notification
Devices (SEND), these systems integrate digital satellite
tracking and relay capabilities into portable, handheld
devices for emergency alerting and messaging (Shay,
2012). Globalstar’s SPOT Connect system features a palmsized device connected via Bluetooth to a smart phone, which
serves as the user interface (Bennett, 2012). The system
provides one-way communications capability with location
geotagging using the Globalstar satellite network, allowing
the user to send text-style messages to family, friends, or coworkers. As of 2007, Globalstar sold more than 300,000
SPOT devices, of which the system has been credited with
more than 1,850 rescues in more than 102 countries. Another
satellite based system dubbed ‘‘Spidertracks’’ integrates
technology from GPS, the Iridium Satellite Network, and
Google Maps into a small device installed inside the aircraft
(Lee, 2012). The Spidertracks system automatically reports
the aircraft’s location at two-minute intervals. Spidertracks
automatically notifies selected individuals in the event
connectivity is lost for more than three reporting cycles or
six minutes. Alternatively, the pilot can manually send a
distress signal from a push-button on the device. The
Spidertracks device also allows Bluetooth, two-way text
messaging connectivity via a smart phone application.
DeLorme inReach is a mobile variant of the technology that
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includes similar tracking, reporting, communication, and
interface capabilities as the Spidertracks system (Shay, 2012).
While not as robust as either SPOT or Spidertracks, the U.S.
Forest Service’s Automated Flight Following (AFF) system
offers similar tracking capabilities, providing automated
aircraft route recording and reporting via satellite at 2-minute
intervals (Roth, 2012). Unlike SPOT and Spidertracks, the
AFF system lacks user messaging capability. Although not
specifically designed for search and rescue purposes, satellite
phones offer yet another link to rescuers. Some satellite
phone models incorporate embedded geotagging and SOS
functions (Shay, 2012). While not specifically addressed in
this paper, the efficacy of these emerging search technologies
warrants further study.
Research Methodology
This study posed two research questions:
1. Does the use of Cellular Phone Forensics affect
search duration?
2. Does the use of Radar Forensics affect search
duration?
While not the primary means of locating distressed
crewmembers following an aircraft crash, radar and cellular
forensic methods are becoming much more prevalent
search mechanisms following the COSPAS-SARSAT
cessation of 121.5 MHz satellite monitoring. The study
sought to quantitatively determine the individual contributions of these forensic methods in accelerating the search
process for crashed aircraft.
The following hypotheses were established to answer the
research questions:
H10: There is no significant difference in search
durations of aircraft searches that employ cellular phone
forensics.
H11: There is a significant difference in search durations
of aircraft searches that employ cellular phone forensics.
H20: There is no significant difference in search
durations of aircraft searches that employ radar forensics.
H21: There is a significant difference in search durations
of aircraft searches that employ radar forensics.
This research was performed as a quantitative assessment
of a historical census of search and rescue missions
conducted by the Air Force Rescue Coordination Center
from 2006 to 2011. The scope of the study was limited to
general aviation aircraft in accidents occurring over land in
the contiguous United States. Oklahoma State University
granted an Institutional Review Board exemption for this
study on October 4, 2012. Data for this study was obtained
via Freedom of Information Act request [Case #201301258-F] submitted to the Air Force Rescue Coordination
Center on December 12, 2012.
This study was conducted in concert with other varied
research topics in the search and rescue process. The
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received data included search and rescue mission information from the following categories: ELT type, cellular
phone forensics, radar forensics, and mission duration
reported incrementally in tenths of hours. Cellular and radar
forensic information was limited to an affirmative or
negative indication of whether those individual procedures
were used during the course of the mission. ELT type
information is not germane to this paper, thus will not be
explained further.
The dataset of cellular and radar forensics information
was binary coded based on the use of each respective
forensic process. Data was initially evaluated using a
General Linear Model for SPSS (GLM). To effectively use
the GLM statistical tool, four conditions had to be met:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Independent Observations
Dependent Variable Scale of Interval or Higher
Normal Distributions
Distribution Homogeneity

The study design met the requirements of the GLM
conditions for independent observations, since each search
and rescue mission was conducted independently. Additionally,
the dependent variable of search duration was measured in ratio
scale, exceeding the interval scale requirement. Normality was
tested using a Shapiro-Wilk Normality Test, with an established
significance threshold of p # 0.05. If data was found to not
meet normality requirements, a statistical transformation
procedure was employed to improve normality. When used,
transformed data was retested using the Shapiro-Wilk Test.
Homogeneity was measured using a Levene Test, also with a
significance threshold of p # 0.05.
If any subset of the dataset failed to meet all GLM
requirements, the GLM method could not be used. If individual
subsets met independence, normality, and homogeneity
requirements, the data was retested using an ANOVA test. If
data did not meet ANOVA requirements, the Brown-Forsythe
F-Test of Equality of Means was used. The alternative BrownForsythe test was specifically selected because of its robustness
to unequal samples sizes, non-normal distributions, and
variance heterogeneity (‘‘Univariate,’’ n.d.).
Limitations
This study did not account for the following factors:
1. Search factors influenced by geographic location,
topography, signal shielding or other factors that
factors that may have degraded radar or cellular
signal reception.
2. Variability in radar or cellular phone forensic
methodology.
3. Activation, deployment, weather, logistics, or other
delays affecting search and rescue operations or
assets.
4. Delays encountered in the acquisition or analysis of
radar or cellular phone forensic information.
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Table 1
Forensic methods used among general aviation search missions from 2006–2011.
Year

No Cell Forensics

Cell Forensics

No Radar Forensics

Radar Forensics

Total Missions

2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

88
75
49
10
17
22

9
9
18
19
27
22

49
36
32
4
8
15

48
48
35
25
36
29

97
84
67
29
44
44

Caveats
The researcher imposed the following scope limitations
to control study validity:
1. Only overland missions occurring in the contiguous
United States were assessed to control for the
variability caused by diverse search and rescue
organizational influences and varying search medium
factors (i.e., oceanic vs. overland searches).
2. Missions were only included in the study if the target
objective was positively located.
Results
The collected dataset contained mission data for (N 5
365) individual search and rescue missions conducted
between 2006 and 2011. Annual distribution of mission
data is contained in Table 1.
The distribution of the dependent variable of mission
duration produced a positive (right) skewed, non-normal,
unimodal distribution (see Figure 1).
The visual histogram showed a clearly non-normal
distribution. This observation was confirmed using the
Shapiro-Wilk Test, which yielded a significance of p ,
0.001, a non-normal finding.

Figure 1. Displays highly-right skew distribution of mission durations.

To meet the requirements to use the GLM, the data was
transformed to generate a nearly-normal distribution using a
logarithmic transformation algorithm. The data results were
retransformed back to hours to report useful information (see
Figure 2).
A retest of the transformed data using Shapiro-Wilk
resulted in a significance of p 5 0.059, suggesting
normality. This is further evidenced visually in a Q-Q
Plot of the dependent variable in Figure 3. This result met
the third requirement to use the GLM.
The data was finally tested for homogeneity using the
Levene Test, yielding the results reported in Table 2.
The Levene Test yielded significant results for the Radar
Forensics data, when compared against the established
alpha level of p# 0.05. This finding indicated the data was
not homogeneous, thus the GLM approach was abandoned.
Hypothesis Testing: Hypothesis 1
Since the data for data subset of cellular phone forensics
met independence, normality, and homogeneity requirement (see Table 3), the ANOVA test was used to assess the
cell phone data yielding the results contained in Table 4.
The ANOVA test yielded a significance of p , 0.001,
exceeding the alpha value. This finding indicates a

Figure 2. Following data transformation procedure, histogram is more
characteristic of a normal distribution.
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Figure 3. Comparison of Q-Q Normality Plots before and after data transformation. Expected normality is indicated by the solid, angular line. Data plots are
those of the dependent variable.

rejection of research hypothesis 1 suggests there is a
significant difference in search duration for aircraft
searches which employ cellular phone forensics.
Table 2
Levene test for homogeneity of variance.
Category
Cellular Phone Forensics
Radar Forensics

Levene Statistic

df1

df2

Sig

1.266
8.922

1
1

363
363

.261
.003

Hypothesis Testing: Hypothesis 2
Since the data for radar forensics failed to meet
homogeneity of variance requirements to use the
ANOVA test (see Table 5), the alternative BrownForsythe F-Test was used yielding the results in Table 6.
The Brown-Forsythe Test resulted in a p-value of p ,
0.001, suggesting a rejection of research hypothesis two indicating that there is a significant difference in the durations
of aircraft searches that utilize radar forensic methods.
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Table 3
Transformed descriptive statistics for cellular phone forensics use.
Statistic

No Cell Forensics

Cell Forensics

Total

261
1.1201(13.19)
0.49735(3.14)
0.03079(1.07)
1.0595(11.47)
1.1807(15.16)
20.40 (0.40)
2.86(724.44)

104
1.36961(23.42)
0.45079(2.82)
0.04420(1.11)
1.3085(20.35)
1.4838 (30.46)
0.00(1.00)
2.71(512.86)

365
1.1987
0.49976
0.02616
1.1473
1.2502
20.40
2.86

N
M
SD
SE
95% CI (L)
95% CI (U)
Minimum
Maximum

Note: Logarithmic values reconverted into duration hours represented in parentheses.
Table 4
ANOVA test of cellular phone forensics.
ANOVA
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

SS

df

Mean Square

F

Sig

5.667
85.244
90.911

1
363
364

5.667
.235

24.133

,.001

Table 5
Descriptive statistics for radar forensics use.
Statistic
N
M
SD
SE
95% CI (L)
95% CI (U)
Minimum
Maximum

No Radar Forensics

Radar Forensics

Total

144
1.0001(10.00)
0.39406(2.48)
0.03284(1.08)
0.9352(8.61)
1.0651(11.62)
20.40(0.40)
2.12(131.83)

221
1.3282(21.29)
0.519291(3.31)
0.03493(1.08)
1.2593(18.17)
1.3970(24.95)
0.03(1.07)
2.86(724.44)

365
1.1987
0.49976
0.02616
1.1473
1.2502
20.40
2.86

Note: Logarithmic values reconverted into duration hours represented in parentheses.

Conclusions
The study’s results show that missions employing either
cellular phone or radar forensic search methods resulted in
a significantly different search durations over missions
which did not employ forensic methods. Interestingly, the
descriptive statistics indicate that the use of forensic
methods in search and rescue results in higher search
durations than if those methods are not used. If cellular
phone forensics were used, the mean mission duration was
23.4 hours versus only 13.2 hours for missions which did
not use cellular forensics. Similarly, if radar forensics were
used during a search mission, the mean mission duration
was 21.3 hours versus 10.0 hours if radar forensics were
not used.
Table 6
Brown-Forsythe test of equality of means for radar forensics.
Category
Radar Forensics

Brown-Forsythe
Statistic

df1

df2

Sig

46.812

1

354.599

,.001

This revelation was counterintuitive since forensic
methods were expected to add valuable information to
the search and rescue process, thus giving searchers
additional means to confine search operations. One possible explanation for this finding is that searchers may
exhaust traditional aviation search methods, such as ELT
detection, before employing alternative forensic search
methods. Another possible explanation for the finding is
that the analysis of the forensic data may require significant
time to acquire and process for meaningful information.
Since both of these factors were not assessed during the
course of this study, they are merely speculative. Clearly,
additional research is necessary to understand why the use
of radar and cellular forensic methods resulted in elevated
search durations.
Nevertheless, reliance on forensic search methods is
increasing. As indicated in Table 1, the proportion of
missions employing forensic search methods has increased
from 2006 to 2011. With the cessation of COSPASSARSAT monitoring of 121.5 MHz ELTs, it is likely that
forensic search methods will become increasingly important tools in locating crashed aircraft.

R. J. Wallace / Journal of Aviation Technology and Engineering

References
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association. (2011). FCC halts pursuit of
121.5 MHz ELT ban. Retrieved from http://www.aopa.org/advocacy/
articles/2011/110113fcc_halts_pursuit_of_elt_ban.html
Bennett, B. (2012). SPOT overview [PowerPoint slides]. Retrieved from http://
www.ntsb.gov/news/events/2012/GA_Search_Rescue/presentations/
Bennett.pdf
Brown, S. (2013, February 28). FCC floats new 121.5 MHz ELT ban
proposal. Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association. Retrieved from
http://www.aopa.org/advocacy/articles/2013/130228fcc-floats-new-eltbanproposal.html.
COSPAS-SARSAT. (2009a). Cospas-Sarsat phase out plan for 121.5/
243 MHz satellite alerting services (Technical Report C/S R.010 Issue
1 Rev 8).
COSPAS-SARSAT. (2009b). Introduction to the COSPAS-SARSAT
System, Issue 6. Retrieved from http://www.cospassarsat.org/images/
stories/SystemDocs/Current/G3.OCT29.09.pdf.
Di Justo, P. (2009). Where in the world is my iPhone? Wired, 17(2).
Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/274380455?
accountid54117
Electronic Code of Federal Regulations. (2014, Jan 27). (Federal
Regulations Register). Retrieved from http://www.ecfr.gov.
Federal Aviation Administration. (2012). Emergency services available to
pilots. Retrieved from http://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/
atpubs/aim/aim0602.html
Federal Aviation Administration. (2006). Use of portable electronic
devices aboard aircraft. (Advisory Circular 91-21.1B). Retrieved from
www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC%2091.
21-1B.pdf.
Federal Communications Commission. (2014, Jan. 23). FAQ on proposals
to expand consumer access to inflight mobile services. Retrieved from
http://www.fcc.gov/guides/wireless-devices-airplanes
Gauthier, S. (2009). Operational differences between MEOSAR and GEO/
LEOSAR capabilities. (Department of National Defense Canada Report
DRDC CORA TM 2009-011).

43

Hall, D. S. (1980). Systems analysis of the installation, mounting, and
activation of Emergency Locator Transmitters in general aviation
aircraft. (NASA Technical Report NASA-CR-160036). Tempe, AZ:
Robertson Research.
Hatfield, D. N. (2002). A report on technical and operational issues
impacting the provision of wireless enhanced 911 services. (Federal
Communications Commission Report). Retrieved from https://c.ymcdn.
com/sites/www.nena.org/resource/collection/22DBDB9D-FBD7-445EA760-1C39A222ED34/Hatfieldreport_1.pdf
Lee, J. (2012). Spidertracks: Satellite based aircraft tracking & emergency
notification system [PowerPoint Slides]. Retrieved from http://www.
ntsb.gov/news/events/2012/GA_Search_Rescue/presentations/Lee.pdf
National Search and Rescue Committee. (2011). Land search and rescue
addendum to the national search and rescue supplement to the
international aeronautical and maritime search and rescue manual
version 1.0. Retrieved from http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg534/nsarc/
Land_SAR_Addendum/Published_Land%20SAR%20Addendum%
20(1118111)%20-%20Bookmark.pdf.
Roth, B. (2012). Automated flight following [PowerPoint Slides].
Retrieved from http://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/2012/GA_Search_
Rescue/presentations/Roth.pdf
Shay, P. (2012). Commercial satellite safety communications for general
aviation [PowerPoint Slides]. Retrieved from http://www.ntsb.gov/
news/events/2012/GA_Search_Rescue/presentations/Shay.pdf
Toth, S. & Gershkoff, I. (1979). Control of ELT false alarms (NASA
Report Contract NASW-3229). Annapolis, MD: ARINC Research
Corporation.
Trudell, B. J. & Dreibelbis, R. R. (1990). Current Emergency Locator
Transmitter (ELT) deficiencies and potential improvements utilizing
TSO-91a ELTs (NASA Contractor Report 4330).
Univariate GLM, ANOVA, and ANCOVA. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://
computerwranglers.com/Com531/Handouts/512%20stuff/Univariate%
20ANOVA.doc
U.S. Coast Guard. (n.d.). Time to get a 406 MHz ELT [PowerPoint
Slides]. Retrieved from http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg534/Emergency
Beacons/GetA406ELT.ppt

